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Notes on a Bicentennial Constitution:
Part II, Antinomial Choices and the
Role of the Supreme Courtt
William Van Alstyne*

Arguments respecting the role 1 of the United States Supreme Court in
American government have flourished in recent years. They have tended
to preoccupy the professional literature on constitutionallaw,2 pressing off
to one side more conventional writing addressed to the substantive treatment of particular constitutional clauses and cases. Since this is the
bicentennial of the Constitution, however, professional review of the
Supreme Court's role is surely a wdcome development. It helps avoid one
of those "misfortunes of the law" noted by Justice Holmes in 1912, namely,
the tendency "that ideas become encysted in phrases and thereafter for a
long time cease to provoke further analysis." 3 The role of the Supreme
Court has assuredly not been allowed to become an encysted or
unexamined idea. To the contrary, it has provoked a great deal of thought.
Nevertheless, I have been puzzled by some of this literature, partly for
reasons I have addressed elsewhere in three short articles that appeared
during the past two years. 4 This puzzlement has been due less to any
t A modified version of this paper and the following three commentaries were delivered
at a symposium, "In Celebration of the Bicentennial of the United States Constitution," at the
University of Iowa College of Law on Oct. 17, 1986. The symposium was funded in part by
grants from the Iowa Humanities Board and the National Endowment for the Humanities.
Papers and commentary delivered at the first session of the symposium were published in Vol.
72, Issue 2 (January 1987) of the Iowa Law Review.
*Perkins Professor of Law, Duke University.
I. Or perhaps one should say the role, or the most important role, to distinguish some
conventional expectations of the role that are less subject to dispute (e.g., the Court's role in
resolving intercircuit disagreements respecting the interpretation of acts of Congress).
2. Probably not since the Great Depression has there been any equivalent outpouring of
suggestions on how the Supreme Court should conduct the enterprise of judicial review, and
even then the range of suggestion and criticism was markedly less polycentric than it has
tended to be in recent years. To mention only a very few well-publicized book-length
arguments (leaving out altogether the much larger number of law review articles), see, e.g., J.
CHOPER, jUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE NATIONAL POLITICAL PROCESS (1980) (Court should declare
federalism questions and legislative-executive conflicts non-justiciable); J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND
DISTRUST (1980) (Court should behave modestly in constitutional adjudication, except to
compel change or uphold change providing representation recognition); M. PERRY, THE
CONSTITUTION, THE COURTS, AND HeMAN RIGHTS (1982) (Court should take stronger hand in
securing justice); see also R. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS (1985) (analysis of takings clause of fifth
amendment as archimedean point of Constitution); cf. B. SIEGAN, EcoNOMIC LIBERTIES AND THE
CoNSTITUTION (1980) (Court should resuscitate property-oriented clauses of Constitution).
3. Hyde v. United States, 225 U.S. 347, 391 (1912) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
4. See Van Alstyne, The Second Death of Federalism, 83 MicH. L. REv. 1709 (1985)
[hereinafter The Second Death of Federalism]; Van Alstyne, Notes on a Bicentennial Constitution:
Part I, Processes of Change, 1984 U. ILL L. REv. 933 (1984) [hereinafter Notes on a Bicentennial
Constitution: Part I]; Van Alstyne, Interpreting This Constitution: The Unhelpful Contributions of
Special Theories of judicial Review, 35 U. FLA. L. REV. 209 (1983) [hereinafter Interpreting This
Constitution]. For a critical response, see generally Saphire, Constitutional Theory in Perspective:
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particularized misgivings respecting the strong social preferences a number
of collea!~ues reflect than to the manner in which each assumes to engage
the judiciary and, more particularly, the Supreme Court in these tasks. The
matter is most acute in respect to the Supreme Court and the Constitution
itself.
Simply put, my naivete has been such that I could not agree that the
judges should or could in good faith freely act on some of these various
proposah. consistent with their oath of office and their obligations of
judicial review. The strain between that oath and that duty, and the urgings
of some writers, seemed too great to be reconciled. They seemed to me to
frame an antinomiaP rather than a compatible choice. If, underneath, the
conflict was as severe as it appeared to be, resolving that conflict should
virtually l~equire an amendment to the Constitution to recast the obligation-the role-of the Supreme Court. No one has proposed such an
amendment.
Within the last year, I was obliged to consider the matter again, in
preparing an essay on the role of the Supreme Court for the Encyclopedia of
the American Constitution. In contrast with the way one has to labor over a law
review article, however, I thought of this task as an easier and altogether
more welcome task. Unlike the more personalized or judgmental character
of a Jaw review article, the encyclopedia essay was meant to be merely
descriptive and serviceably reportorial. It was not meant to bear any
responsibility of argument, but, rather, a lighter burden of description and
review: to provide a fair and informative review of the categories of
responsibility associated with the Supreme Court in our national life. As
such a review, it would leave the reader to consult the balance of the
Encyclopedia's numerous essays for a more particular consideration of
political perspectives and of partisan debate respecting the Court's successes and failures.
Unexpectedly, however, that simple attempt foundered or, rather,
wrote itself into a dead end. For as its descriptive listings lengthened to
include each role the Supreme Court has been thought to serVe in our
national life, the essay became an embarrassment. In a word, the enterprise
kept coming apart at the seams. Some of the tasks claimed by the Court (or
claimed by others for the Court) the Court might do, or others it might do,
but the Court would not do all of the tasks at the same time-at least not
equally well, and not without a considerable amount offudging. To be sure,
one could pretend otherwise and, up to a point, the pretense might
succeed. Still, it seemed to cheat the reader not to notice the underlying
problem. Things felt more straightfonvard only after a considerable scaling
down of that essay,' to make it easier to lay bare the more essential matters
quickly, without fudging or glossing over the problems that the first,
indiscriminate listing of roles approach had seemed to do.
A Response to Professor Van Alstyne, 78 Nw. U.L.

REV. 1435 (1984).
5. "Amir.omy" is an apparent contradiction between valid principles or inferences that
seem equally necessary. AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY 57 (W. Morris ed. 1971) (based on
Latin word "antinomia," which derived from Greek words "anti," meaning "against," and
"nomos," meaning "law").
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The basic problem with the original essay was caught by the happenstance of having listed two Supreme Court roles separately, instead of
treating them indivisibly, as is customarily done. It is that same problem I
want to lay bare here-the problem of indivisibly associating two fundamentally different views of the Supreme Court's main role. This short
Article will try to make the same point somewhat more graphically, by
recourse to a strategic device. It then reviews some norms of judicial review.

I.
At least since the time of Plato and The Republic, constitutionalists
generally have put forward various visions of personal and social justice,
i.e., of how they think a just and well-ordered nation state ought to operate:
how it ought to function best for the common good. 6 Within the United
States itself, interpreters have come to our own Constitution with a similar
intention, to describe how it ought best to work. The Supreme Court, they
suggest (and the point seems obviously right), has the main role ultimately
in attempting to see that the government observes basic justice. The Court's
power of judicial review, and most particularly of substantive constitutional
review, is the ultimate means by which it carries out that role.
It follows quite naturally that the yardstick by which decisions of the
Court are themselves best judged is the yardstick of simple justice itself. Do
the Court's decisions, particularly its decisions of constitutional law, do
justice, or do they yield to things-or presume to do things-that seem to
be fundamentally unfair? This standard tends to be the common standard
by which the Court's decisions are frequently judged. It is assuredly the
most common standard that the Court is urged to follow.
To be sure, 'justice" is an elusive and contestable idea, and it is neither
assumed nor alleged that judges have a monopoly on knowing justice.
Rather, it is an aspiration and a guiding dictate. And it is the insulation the
judges are given from aspects of the crasser political process, such as
lobbying, vote-trading, and immediate self-interest, that gives them the
special obligation in checking injustice-at least in the fundamental or
constitutional sense. So the Court should feel bound to intervene on
constitutional grounds-to see that an injustice has not been done, especially when the legislation the judges review has earmarks of political
suspiciousness. 7 Indeed, however, it is presumably appropriate for them to
consider the matter of justice equally in every case, not just for suspicious
cases as just defined. Accordingly, the satisfactoriness of a court's decisions
6. So, in The Republic, Socrates suggests that the perplexity of what is justice for a single
person is a great perplexity indeed, but perhaps it can be discovered by examining the same
question in reference to a larger community first, within which individual justice can be
deduced. ("If it please you, then, let us first look for its quality [the quality of justice] in states,
and then only examine it also in the individual, looking for the likeness of the greater in the
form of the less."). From this premise, the balance of the dialogue proceeds to lay out a
complete description of a just system of government and law. PLATO: CoLLECTED DIALOGUES 615
(E. Hamilton & H. Cairns eds. 1966).
.
7. That is, considerations such as how the legislation got enacted, who favored it, and
whom did it disfavor-variations on footnote 4 of United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304
U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938).
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should be tested by their conformity or nonconformity to the standard of
ultimate justice, and perhaps by that standard exclusively. Most especially
should that be so in respect to the highest court, the Supreme Court, in its
e:{ercise of constitutional review. The alternative, one may suggest, is a
savage fli:jht to moral nihilism, an abandonment of the judicial role.
This is, to be sure, an oversimplified account of what a number of
commentators have suggested on how one measures the success of courts in
living up to the judicial role and thus what that main role is. There are
substantial variations, subtle and othenvise, including alternative ways of
putting the same thing, as well as sharply conflicting views on what justice
does or does not require. But, underneath, many are bound together by
this common understanding of the main role of the Supreme Court,
however differently they sometimes reason about the outcome or the
acceptability of a particular constitutional case.
For instance, an alternative way of saying about the same thing is
found in discourses on the Supreme Court that tend to divide its decisions
into three kinds, according to what one may correspondingly judge of the
excellence of the Court's work and, presumably, the extent to which it
capably o1· incapably performs its role. The three kinds of constitutional
decisions one might identify are legitimating, braking, and catalytic decisions, each being descriptive of what each represents in reporting the
fulfillmem. of the Supreme Court's main role in seeing justice done.
Accordingly, the first kind of decision, a legitimating decision, does
just what it implies; it is a judicial decision that confers legitimacy upon an
act of govt:·rnment. By sustaining an act against constitutional objection, the
Court atte-sts to the act's fundamental integrity and is itself correspondingly
to be judg,;d for having done so. The Court, in brief, provides the ultimate
imprimatur of judicial approval. By sustaining an act against constitutional
objection, the Court warrants that nothing in the act is fundamentally
amiss. Vouching for the legitimacy of acts of Congress is a part of the
Court's main role.
In just the same way, a braking decision arrests ill-advised legislative or
executive action; it is a decision either interpreting an act against the
government's desire or a decision holding the act unconstitutional. It is
used to force the government to reconsider what the Court has determined
to have been much too precipitate or fundamentally unfair for the
government to have tried to do. And, in keeping with this analytic
framework, a catalytic decision is one that is constitutionally stimulative. It
is a decision compelling government action not previously forthcoming
from departments that may be politically bogged down and unreasonably
sluggish in failing to act. A catalytic decision is judicial action requiring the
government to act affirmatively to see that social and personal justice is
done.
By sorting through the Court's legitimating, braking, and catalytic
decisions, one may also assess the extent to which the Court has, or has not,
lived up to its own best potential, in fulfillment of its singular and most
appropriat·e institutional role. If it has, then presumably it is to be
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commended. If it has not, 8 then it is to be faulted and urged to change, to
bring the Court back to its real assigned task of seeing that basic justice is
done under the Constitution of the United States.
Probably this alternative description is also oversimplified, even as was
the first one. It will do, however, for my purposes and it can be tested for
our purposes at once-by asking you to submit guilelessly to the following
quiz respecting what the Supreme Court should do. The object of this quiz
is straightforward; it is to see to what extent one agrees or disagrees with
each statement respecting what the Supreme Court should do. The
differences among these statements simply reflect variations on several
kinds of issues as they tend to be raised by different kinds of constitutional
disputes. Each also furnishes its own stipulation or proposed example of
social justice, which allows one to signal one's view as to what the Supreme
Court ought to do. By checking particular statements and by leaving others
blank, one will indicate one's own tendency to say what the role of the
Supreme Court should be.
In my view, a Supreme Court whose judges properly exercise the
responsibility of their office will:
1. sustain such acts of Congress as are plainly conducive to the
general welfare of the people of the United States._ _
2. sustain such acts of Congress as are duly enacted under
representative auspices of what constitutes the general welfare, even if those acts do not seem wise or necessarily well
advised [to the Court] as a matter of social choice. _ _
3. invalidate such acts of Congress as are unfair or exploitative,
at least when the evidence is clear and convincing that such
acts were not the consequence of considered and representative reflection. _ _
4. observe the same role in respect to the President and the
states as described in 3 supra in respect to Congress._ _
5. invalidate such legislation whether national, state, or local, as
reflects an underappreciation of those whom it adversely
affects, at least when those whom it disadvantages appear to
lack an effective participating voice or presence in the electorate or the legislature. _ _
6. sustain such legislation, whether national, state, or local, as
increases the participating opportunities of historically excluded or disadvantaged groups of people for equal dignity
and respect. _ _
7. invalidate such legislation as reflects a mere political intolerance of difference in matters of intimate personal choice
among consenting adults who threaten no harm to others.
8. protect competitive opportunities, a free market, and private
8. For example, if the Court has legitimated a thoroughly discreditable act.
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rights of contract against officious acts of government inconsistent with personal economic freedom. _ _
9. invalidate such acts of Congress as unduly interfere with the
;;,utonomy of each state to prefer standards of conduct and
values different from those of its neighbor. _ _
10. all of the above~
11. not necessarily any of the above, but, rather, [here substitute
your different or additional description of the Supreme
Court's proper role insofar as it is not represented in the
above list]. _ _

II.
Strictly speaking, I believe there was only one correct answer in the
preceding short quiz and that any other answer would have been incorrect
or, at the least, seriously incomplete. Specifically, one should have marked
only number eleven and then briefly should have written, possibly as one's
complete answer, a sentence of the following sort:
Some of the above, and possibly even all of the above (since each
seems consistent with eminently reasonable ways of doing justice),
but of course to no greater extent than the Constitution provides.
Alternatively, one would have added this qualification in each of the blanks
one was eothenvise inclined to check, to state what the Supreme Court
should do. In no case, however, would one check anything on the list
without adding this qualification expressly.
One may initially think this qualification will not produce much
change-that the effect will be pretty much as before, when no such
repetitious or pro forma qualification was attached to each positive answer
one had already recorded. So the whole thing may look more like a quibble
than a real change; a mere boilerplate afterthought, or a formalistic
addendum fastidiously tacked on as a nod to conventional proprieties of
constitutio.nal review. Indeed, it is a virtual certainty that many will think
that this is entirely the case-that adding this qualification adds absolutely
nothing at all.
Still, for most of us, that is probably not quite true. The nagging
addition tends to draw its own attention. There is likely to be some slight
change, and the change is even likely to become considerable, depending
on the seriousness and earnestness of one's new intent.
The constraining addendum first exerts a light tug on one's attention;
it may pull in the direction of specific case outcomes in increasing tension
with what one might othenvise have decided when the test was just the
looser, policy-preoccupied, unqualified proposition first set down. Allow
that much to happen and so also may something more; the qualifying
addendum may gradually seize hold of the looser proposition, subjecting
that proposition to some degree of critical discipline altogether missing
within its naked original formulation. In the end, depending upon how
seriously one takes the qualification, the addendum may eventually claim
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dominion over the entire ground. It will displace the whole of the statement
to which it is attached. Indeed, it will end by standing alone-attached to
nothing but itself. It will become the sole test of the main task, as it were, of
an oath-bound judge of the Supreme Court. 9 The transformation will have
been completed. In fact, it will lead to a wholly different view of one's
enterprise and one's concept of the judicial role.
I shall take up here one easy example, namely the first statement in the
quiz, to illustrate what would happen if one proceeded likewise through the
whole of the original list. The first statement in the quiz read approximately
like this:
In my view, a Supreme Court whose judges properly exercise the
responsibility of their office will sustain such acts of Congress as
are plainly conducive to the general welfare of the people of the
United States.
But we then altered it by adding to it a (slight?) qualification, to say this:
In my view, a Supreme Court whose judges properly exercise the
responsibility of their office will sustain such acts of Congress as
are plainly conducive to the general welfare of the people of the
United States, but of course to no greater extent than the
Constitution provides.
Surely it is true that even the necessary first effect of this rephrasing is
to draw one's attention somewhat over and beyond the original question, is
it not? For the first time one begins to focus on the Constitution, on what
one thinks it provides as to the legislation in question, and not obsessively
on the effects of the legislation-on whether the legislation may or may not
be conducive to the common good. Only on the premature supposition that
the latter category is necessarily within the former would one say our
qualification added nothing, that it doesn't add anything that could actually
affect the result. But the very act of adding the qualification qua qualification implies the possibility of a disjunction. Indeed, it concedes some
possibility of a gap-between national legislation "plainly conducive to the
general welfare" (as one considers it to be or concedes at least that Congress
might reasonably so regard it). and what the Constitution itself may or may
not authorize Congress to do.
Indeed, once one not only adds in the qualification but resolves also to
give it full faith and credit, as .it were, it must tend inexorably not just to
qualify the statement to which it is attached, but toward a far stronger effect
than that. Eventually, as one repeats it and comes gradually to take an
extended interest in it, 10 its emerging centrality must in increasing measure
dominate each statement to which it is added. In fact, even this is too weak
a statement of its eventual consequence. Rather, the added phrase actually
will claim the whole ground. The relevance of each original statement will
9. See, e.g., Hart, The Power of Congress to Limit the jurisdiction of Federal Courts: An Exercise
in Dialectic, 66 HARV. L. REV. 1362, 1402 (1953) ("UJurisdiction always is jurisdiction only to
decide constitutionally." (emphasis added)).
10. I believe this does tend to happen with some who serve on the Supreme Court. They
gradually take an increasing interest in these things, grow into a different job, and thus acquire
a different sense of the judicial obligation.
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recede and eventually disappear; it will remain relevant only to the extent
it is "repl)rted out" again, that is, only to the extent that it can be found
inside and as part of the second statement as well. Otherwise, it doesn't
count at all.
The Constitution now occupies the whole ground for this judge. It
asserts a preemptive claim on his or her loyalty and recasts the statement of
judicial obligation in decidedly different-appearing form. And insofar as
that is true, nothing more is lost from the first statement than if it were
recast in r.hls way:
In my view, a Supreme Court whose judges properly exercise the
responsibility of their office will not depart from what in fact they
understand the Constitution provides. It will accordingly apply
such acts of Congress as it believes are provided for; it will apply
none that it believes are not.
And whether such acts of Congress are or are not "conducive to the general
welfare" in the Court's or in Congress' view disappears as a question except
a~ the Constitution may make that question germane.u
The same will be so in every other instance on our list. The dominion
of the original normative predicate will altogether disappear. It will count
merely to the extent that it turns out to be germane to the co~stitutional
question on its merits-it cannot count twice and may not count even
once.J2 It has no separate or additional force apart from such force as the
Constitution may or may not already grant it, which it is the obligation of
good faith judges to figure out.

III.
The principal role of the Court is rightly identified with Marbury v.
Madison,1s its most famous case, and with the observations of John
Marshall, its most famous Chief Justice, who correctly identified that role
with a judicial responsibility to apply no act inconsistent with the Constitution. The Court is assigned a role of independent adjudicative obligation
pursuant to the judges' own oaths, Marshall effectively observed, in respect
to a significant, albeit limited, variety of cases, namely those described in
article III of the Constitution itself. Its function is to consider in good faith
such disputes as litigants have with respect to interpretations or conflicts of
law that directly and materially affect them, to the extent their cases fall
within th<:· categories of cases described in article III plus such acts of
Congress as may regulate the Court's jurisdiction and the criteria for more
particular selection the judges are at liberty to maintain.
In re!;pect to constitutional questions arising as to acts of Congress or
the acts of the fifty states, "courts are concerned only with the power to
enact ... statutes, not with their [constitutional] wisdom," as Chief Justice
I I. A matter one cannot know about in advance, i.e., the normative condition may, a priori,
be (a) a necetsary but not sufficient condition of constitutionality; (b) a sufficient condition of
constitutionality; (c) not a condition of constitutionality at all.
I2. See supra note I I.
I3. !i U.S. (I Cranch) I37 (I803).
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Stone correctly observed. 14 The same is true with respect to the Constitution itself, even as Justice Roberts sharply observed in the same case:
[When] an act of Congress is appropriately challenged in the
courts as not conforming to the constitutional mandate the
judicial branch of the Government has only one duty,-to lay the
article of the Constitution which is invoked beside the statute
which is challenged and to decide whether the latter squa:res with
the former. 15
The Constitution, in short, like Plato's Republic, may have its own
theory of justice-and it is that theory that is to govern insofar as it is this
Constitution, and not Plato's or Rawls' that furnishes the supreme law of
the land. 16 So, for instance, if it is plain that one aspect of this Constitution's
theory is that power is more appropriately dispersed rather than concentrated (e.g., through the provisions horizontally for separated powers, and
vertically through the enumeration of specified national powers and the
italicized tenth amendment reserve of what is not enumerated to the states
or the people), the task of judges is to understand and to apply it rather
than to ignore or otherwise misrepresent it because some other theory of
social justice (i.e., of social organization) might seem to Congress or to
others to be more conducive to the common good, more efficient, or better
advised. Alterations in the plan of the Constitution are reserved from the
Court as well as from CongressP At most, Congress may propose such
amendments additional to the twenty-six already put in place, and take its
chances under the provisions of article V. In the meantime, the Constitution "as is" prescribes the boundaries, the separations, and the limits, even
as Marbury v. Madison itself illustrates. In a concrete way, this is all that
Justice Roberts' dictum (quoted supra) means to say as weiJ.IS
14. United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 78 (1936) (Stone, J., dissenting).
15. !d. at 62.
16. For an example of a strongly contrasting model respecting the proper organization of
constitutional government, neimer Platonic nor Rawlsian, and quite different from our own as
well, see 1977 KoNST. SSSR (Constitution of me Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) art. 3
("The Soviet state is organised and functions on the principle of democratic centralism, ... ").
See also id. art. 6 ("The leading and guiding force of Soviet society and the nucleus of its
political system, of all state organisations and public organisations, is the Communist Party of
the Soviet Union . . . [which,] armed with Marxism-Leninism, determines the general
perspectives of me development of society and me course of the home and foreign policy of
the USSR....").
Given these sorts of provisions, one would expect that if Soviet courts were possessed of a
power of constitutional review, as mey are not, they would still not reach "the same"
conclusions in comparable cases as should our own Supreme Court in applying the very
different provisions of our Constitution. They would be correct in not doing so, or at least
ought not be faulted for not doing so, moreover, as our Court would not be correct were it to
follow suit.
17. Amendments furnish me cambium rings (growth rings) in me Constitution. See Van
Alstyne, Notes on a Bicentennial C=titutian: Part I, supra note 4, at 951-58; cJ. Ackerman, The
Storrs Lectures: Discovering the C=titution, 93 YALE L.J. 1013 (1984). Whether they are
improvements is largely a matter of point of view (e.g., the eighteenth amendment and/or its
re_peal by the twenty-first amendment, the ill-fated ERA, and me pending state proposals to
provide a measure of fiscal restraint).
18. The point is utterly uncontroversial, one would suppose. Yet, it scarcely seems even to
be acknowledged, much less is it met, in some arguments respecting me role of judges and the
Constitution. See, e.g., Barber, Unwritten Constitution, in 4 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE A~IERICAN
CoNSTITLTION 1949-51 (1986).
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To make the point plain by example one more time, it will be useful to
go back to our quiz. We shall take another abstracted statement and see
graphically where the complete difference in emphasis lies. Proposition
number ~ix 1 9 originally appeared this way:
In my view, a Supreme Court whose judges properly exercise the
responsibility of their office will sustain such legislation, whether
national, state, or local, as increases the participating opportunities of historically excluded or disadvantaged groups of people for
equal dignity and respect.
According to this view, the role of the Court is clear. It is to determine as
b•;!st it conscientiously can whether the legislation is of the kind that fits the
rcquirem•:nts of this sentence, and accordingly hold it valid or not.
In our first qualified reformulation, however, the test became one of
two parts, rather than merely one. So the test becomes:
In my view, a Supreme Court whose judges properly exercise the
responsibility of their office will sustain such legislation ... as
increases the participating opportunities of historically excluded
or di~advantaged groups of people for equal dignity and respect,
but of course to no greater extent than the Constitution provides.
And insofar as one understands the matter properly, the first formulation
will finally drop altogether away, leaving only the following unprepossessing, untilted form:
In my view, the correct role of the Supreme Court is to sustain
such legislation as may be provided for by the Constitution (for
they assuredly have no warrant to hold unconstitutional such
legislation as is provided for), and not othenvise.
Under thh test, the original, modified Ely-Dworkin formulation counts for
absolutely nothing as such because it adds literally nothing to help define
the judicial task. If the Constitution provides for such legislation, it should
be sustained and if the Constitution does not, then it should not. The
matter is no more arcane than that.
To be sure, we have glossed over every problem of "interpretation."2°
But I submit even now that the difference in one's orientation is profound,
rather than merely cosmetic or trivial, if one agrees with the main task of
the Court as just described. 21 First, it centers the object of one's inquiry.
19. The proposition reflects a view put forth by John Ely, see J. ELY,supra note 2, at 135-79,
mingled with a view sponsored by Ronald Dworkin, see generally R. DwoRKIN, TAKING RIGHTS
SEPIOt:SLY (1977).
20. Compare Professor Hart's pleasant reassurance that "[i]t's a perfectly good Constitution if we know how to interpret it." Hart, su,bra note 9, at 1372. For an excellent and succinct
1·eview of the general problem, see Brest, Constitutional Interpretation, in 1 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE
AMI.RIC;\N CO'ISTITlTION 464 (1986).
21. It mun be obvious even in the first case, for example, that the nature of things to be
loohed at, or ''interpreted" if you will, will be utterly different as between these two questions:
A. Is the X Act of Congress conducive to the general welfare of the people of the
United States?
A 1• Is the X Act of Congress provided for among the enumerated or implied
powers this Constitution grants?
Unless one st•.pposcs that A 1 is subsumed in A (and there is no reason a priori to think that it
will be), one will not imagine them to be merely different statements of the same question.
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Second, perhaps more importantly, it at once checks the conscious and
unconscious judicial habits of double counting, false counting and simple
wish fulfillment, in the phenomenon of judicial review. 22 It cuts off and
disallows the inveigling influence of normative presupposition, and it
steadies the enterprise of interpretation itself. Even a summary reprise on
what we have just been through may show how this is so, still again.
One may casually have supposed that the Constitution itself probably
does (or surely ought to-for the sake of social justice-and therefore
must?) authorize Congress to enact any legislation plainly conducive to the
general welfare of the people of the United States. But in the setting of the
re-centered question, the supposition or the wish cannot pass without
explanation. Indeed, as such, it cannot pass at all. We have already taken a
major step. Being prepared to admit that the Constitution may not
authorize Congress as we expected (and as we wanted2 3 ), how then does
one expect next to proceed? How, othenvise, ultimately, than by this? That
as one advances into the question-namely, what does the Constitution
authorize?-one will proceed as in any other case one is asked to research
and determine, and, having done so, one will speak truthfully in respect to
what one finds. Fulfilling that obligation, in turn, is not at all strained. One
fulfills it by saying what one has actually concluded after making one's
conscientious review-of what the Constitution provides by way of legislative power in Congress, however, and not about whether a particular act
may or may not be a good thing.
In the case we have supposed, the question is thus what is it that
persuades one that the Constitution does in fact authorize Congress to
enact any law that is merely conducive to the common good, no matter what
the subject? But I mean to leave the matter there, rather than to argue for
a certain conclusion or provide a certain example. As a serious judge
suddenly given a special responsibility to apply the Constitution faithfully
"as is," leaving such alterations as may seem advisable to the cambium rings
of amendments pursuant to article V, answer the question to your own
satisfaction. There is just this one constraint: in the end, do not lie about the
real conclusion you reach, having worked through the subject as best you
know how. Approach the matter this way, and, of course, you may still be
mistaken, even in the narrow sense of subsequently coming to believe you
misapprehended some matter or left out a critical insight of some kind.
Even so, you will at worst merely be mistaken; you will not have
misperceived the task.
By now, it is obvious where this sort of discussion must lead were we
to repeat it according to the entirety of the original list, which mercifully we
will not. It is not a discussion about scholastic or judicial cleverness. Neither
is it yet another set of trite observations about getting behind the ambiguity
Rather, on their face they do not address the same question at all. If A 1 is the sole question for
the Court, moreover, A has no distinct standing as a question at all; it counts OIZ{V insofar as it
is already built into A 1 , which is possible but would have to be affirmatively proved, whether
as a necessary or sufficient condition of satisfying A 1 , the real question before the Court.
22. See the example just provided, supra note 21.
23. Always for the sake of merely expediting "social justice," of course, and never selfishly,
for ourselves.
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or malleable quality of words, that is, how words can be invested with an
array of different interpretations (of course they can) whether in a
constitution, a poem, or some other text. For the question is not what can
one make words do as an interpreter, 24 much less what can one get by with
or make seemingly convincing to others given the will and the zeal to lay
one's politically motivated gloss.25 It is, rather, fundamentally a question of
attitude respecting one's judicial obligation or role, and how that attitude is
translated through the body of one's work.
To he sure, one who thinks that the first obligation of a judge is merely
not to lie in administering the Constitution (which is indeed what I am
arguing) may be dismissed as a crank, the point seems so far removed from
anything others now contest. Still, if one seriously and unaffectedly agrees
with the proposition that the first obligation of a judge is indeed "not to lie,"
in the sense meant here, I suggest it carries a highly useful set of serious
implications alongside. For assuming what one would want to assume,
namely, that mendacity as such26 has not played any large role injudiciaJ
behavior-although I think there is evidence that it sometimes has-at least
its close relatives appear to have had a much freer run of the house. Those
relatives or cousins of knowing misrepresentation reflect a substantial
capacity for easy self-persuasion of what the Constitution does and does not
provide, consciously or unconsciously dominated by personal jurisprudential agendas only instrumentally connected with the Constitution itself. 27
Without purporting to provide more than categories of examples, I
shall try briefly to identify some telltale signs. Along the way, we shall also
look at some standards of constitutional review.2s

24. Or a~. a noninterpreter (cj. the genre of constitutional exegesis called "noninterpretivism," one of the great oxymorons of our age).
25. Cf. Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes,]., dissenting) ("If you
have no doubt of your premises or your power and want a certain result with all your heart you
naturally express your wishes in law and sweep away all opposition.").
26. The sting of mendacity arises from one's disrespect that comes from reading an
extended se· of a particular judge's opinions, gloomily compelling the conclusion that the
judge will apply the Constitution quite strictly when its preferences are the same as the judge's
own, but who will then patronizingly dismiss as mere unenlightened historicism the exact same
kinds of obs~rvations offered against the same judge's preferred conclusions in other cases.
For other Unds of telltale signs, ~ee generally infra text accompanying notes 29-44.
27. The problems next referred to need to be tracked within the work of a particular judge
in respect to what that judge does and declares in accounting for his or her decisions, rather
than to consi~tency as such in respect to the Court as a whole. That judges, like the rest of us,
may in good faith disagree on the appropriate weight or relevance or persuasiveness of
particular te::t, history, precedent, allocation of burden, orientation to constitutional interpretation (vis-a-ds statutory interpretation), etc., is not at issue here in any way, as I trust the
emuing dbcussion takes care to acknowledge. Cf Easterbrook, Ways l)f Criticizing the Court, 95
H,'.RV. L. RE\. 802, 832 (1982) (concluding thatjustices inevitably make decisions inconsistent
wilh those of other justices, and that while we may ask each justice to develop a consistent,
principled jurisprudence, we cannot ask same of Court as whole).
28. Ste general(l' Greenawalt, The Enduring Significance of Neutral Prinaples, 78 Cou:M. L.
RE1'. 982 (19'78); Monaghan, Our Perftct Con.;titution, 56 N.Y.U. L. REv. 353 (1981); Wechsler,
To!l'ard Neutr'll Prmczples of C.mstituionallAw, 73 HAR'I. L. REv. I (1959).
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I think it is probably quite sound, and not just an attempt to preordain
a preferred result, that the general rule of constitutional construction
begins with a strong presumption of generous construction, even as
Marshall and Holmes both proposed, and for the reasons both gave.2 9 But
insofar as that is the right place to begin, then presumably it is the right
place always, regardless of the clause at issue and not mereiy in respect to
such clauses as a judge may like, that is, after hearing what clause is being
invoked, and after determining which sort of construction-narrow or
broad-may be serviceable to a certain result.
Note we are here talking of rebuttable presumptions; we are in all
instances prepared to concede to such exceptions as, by uniform standards,
can in fact be made out. 30 So there is no blind will that will rule out being
29. See Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 432-35 (1920) (Holmes, j.); McCulloch v.
Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316,406-407 (1819) (Marshall,].). The Holmes and Brandeis
dissents in Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928), may furnish an excellent example
of such a presumption. See id. at 469-70 (Holmes, J., dissenting) (noting that "Courts are apt
to err by sticking too closely to the words of a law where those words import a policy that goes
beyond them."); id. at 4 77-79 (Brandeis, J ., dissenting) (rejecting majority position that fourth
amendment operates only where physical trespass is a feature of the "search"). A different
example by Marshall is in his treatment of art. I,§ 10, in Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17
U.s: (4 Wheat.) 518, 629-50 (1819) (holding that corporate charter is contract protected by
contracts clause). The presumption is neutral insofar as it applies uniformly, not selectively
(e.g., insofar as it applies equally to the second amendment and the commerce clause).
30. Forinstance, in dissenting in Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89,97 (1965),Justice Harlan
did not begin by denying a rebuttable presumption of generous construction to the equal
protection clause of the fourteenth amendment. Rather, alerted first by the inclusion in the
same amendment of a separate provision (§ 2) applicable to some forms of voting abridgment,
and driven from there to try to sort out the extent, if any, to which that separate section and
its associated legislative history might bear upon the equal protection clause and its own
relevance to voting and apportionment, Harlan concluded essentially that the presumption of
generous construction and applicability of § 1 had been altogether rebutted. He decided his
vote accordingly, even though it broke with previous precedents already well established
under the equal protection clause. See Nixon v. Condon, 286 U.S. 73, 88-89 (1932) (applying
equal protection clause to strike down political party's rule allowing only whites to participate
in primary elections); Nixon v. Herndon, 273 U.S. 536, 540-41 (1927) (holding that state
statute banning blacks from participating in primary elections violated equal protection
clause). In reviewing the same materials, I was not convinced that the materials were sufficient
to carry the burden required, to create an entire subject matter exception to the equal
protection clause. But it is unimportant for present purposes, as I certainly do not believe that
Justice Harlan was applying some double standard, i.e., a different standard in Carrington than
he conscientiously attempted to apply to other cases. See Van Alstyne, The Fourteenth
Amendment, The "Right" to Vote, and The Understanding of the Thirty-Ninth Congress, 1965 St:P. CT.
REv. 33. Indeed, I believe Justice Harlan was a great judge in the very sense meant to be
supported in this article-ajudge who took the Constitution seriously in virtually every feature
of his work.
As a different example, the Court's decision in United States v. Brown, 381 U.S. 437 (1965),
turns substantially on a rebuttable (and unrebutted?) presumption of generous construction of
the attainder clause in art. I, § 9-which Justice Frankfurter declared was generally a sound
approach but nonetheless believed was not sustainable as to the attainder clause in particular.
See United States v. Lowett, 328 U.S. 303, 321 (1946) (Frankfurter, J., concurring). For a
similar view of article III, see Justice Frankfurter's opinion in National Mut. Ins. Co. v.
Tidewater Transfer Co. 337 U.S. 582, 647 (1949) ("Precisely because 'it is a constitution we are
expounding' ... we ought not take liberties with it."). Again, whether or not one agrees with
Frankfurter on this particular item, his opinion met a high standard of responsibility.
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shown that the presumption can be, and has been, rebutted. Rather, there
is simply an initial disposition that itself seems correct, defensible, and
proper in respect to constitutional clauses, and thus the more appropriate
one with which to begin.
But if, as we say, this seems to be the right place to begin for the
commerce clause (as an example), it seems equally to be the right place to
begin for other clauses too-such as the first amendment, the second
amendment, the clause respecting the impairment of obligations of contracts,31 the takings clause of the fifth amendment, or the eleventh
amendment. Most certainly it would be equally the right place to begin with
respect to other affirmative powers also vested in Congress, such as the
exceptions clause in article III; on its face, that clause is no more restricted
in its scope than is the power of Congress to regulate commerce among the
several states.
Yet, in reading the various opinions of particular judges and of
jurisprudential interpreters of the Constitution, one finds very little consistency in the norm of generous construction; it appears principally as an
ad hoc rhetorical device. Persons temperamentally given to use it to defer
to Congress in respect to congressionally enumerated powers in article I,
for instance, seem very disinclined to do so when the express congressional
power under examination is obviously less welcome, such as the congres.sional powers enumerated in article III. Judges showing the strongest
presumption of generous construction respecting the first amendment rend
not to come to parts of other amendments (e.g., the second amendment, the
takings clause of the fifth amendment) in the same way; they tend similarly
to find very little scope for the contracts impairment clause, article I, section
10.
Unlc:·ss one assumes these judges and others who proceed in like
fashion are unaware of the inconstancy with which the norm of generous
construction is invoked (an assumption one ought not lightly entertain), the
explanation must reside elsewhere. It may, and does, reside in their
sdective mste and distaste for different features of the Constitution. It
resides in a manipulative attitude toward the judicial role. 32
Similar in effect to the principle of generous construction is the notion
that each express clause also may exert a slight penumbral effect, an effect
widening the amplitude or the neighborhood of the application of the
e~:press clause. It is not my point to be critical of this metaphor. To the
contrary, like the rule of generous construction respecting constitutional
31. The dause was so interpreted early on. See, e.g., Dartmouth ~flege v. Woodward, 17
U.S. (•1 Whelt.) 518, 627-50 (1819). For a succinct review, see Mendelson, Contract Clause, in
2 ENCYGLOPElll.\ OF THE AMERICAN CoNSTITl"TION 493 (1986).
32. In his recent monograph that rebukes the New Right for seeking an unduly crabbed set
of comtructions for some amendments (e.g., the fourteenth amendment), Stephan Macedo
nonetheless Jakes care to note: "In a sense, the conservatives do have a point, for both the new
'activist' juri:;prudence and the old are flawed. In both cases, the choice of values to be
protected is partial." S. MACEDO, THE NEw RIGHT v. THE CoNSTJTl"TJON 47 (1986). For a
federal judg<"s concession of the general pomt, see generally Craven, Paean to Pragmatism, 50
N.C.L. REv. 977 (1972). For a recent and exceptionally conscientious review of the mislaid
protections c·f economic liberty under the fourteenth amendment, see generally F. STRONG,
St:nSTANTIVE DeE PRocESs OF L\w: A DICHOTOMY OF SENSE AND Nm.:sENSI. (1986).
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clauses, the notion of penumbral effects may be both useful and fair. 3 3 As
a matter of interpretive orientation, its use need not be strained. 34 Equivalently, others have suggested that the appropriate approach in the first
instance is to grant the nonhousekeeping clauses in the Constitution the
benefit of the doubt, so to speak, by assuming that constitutional clauses
generally embrace connotations rather than mere denotations, 35 or concepts rather than conceptions.36
Each of these suggestions is tentatively useful, as each also illuminates
an ungrudging judicial orientation of generous constitutional construction,
albeit in a somewhat distinctive way. Again, however, if this is so, then it
presumably ought to be so generally rather than selectively. But the
practice does ·not conform to the rule. To the contrary, judges most given
to this method of selectively expansive constitutionalism seem knowingly
unwilling to adhere to it in any general way. 3 7
33. Indeed, the suggestion of "penumbras" may be but an alternative description of the
rule of generous construction.
34. Here, too, one can trace the figure of speech to Justice Holmes. See Springer v.
Philippine Islands, 277 U.S. 189, 209 (1928) (Holmes, J., dissenting) ("The great ordinances
of the Constitution do not establish and divide fields of black and white. Even the more specific
of them are found to terminate in a penumbra shading gradually from one extreme to the
other."); cf. the revival and application of the term by Justice Douglas in Griswold v.
Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 483 (1965), discussed infra note 37.
35. See Freund, Stonns Over The Supreme Court, 69 A.B.A.J. 1474, 1478 (1983). The general
notion is to determine whether a clause enacts a clear principle, as it were, rather than a
congenial set of ad hoc examples alone. If one is satisfied in a serious way that the former was
indeed the case, then even a careless "nonexample" (an example of what may at the time not
have been thought to fit) might be affected nonetheless. Consider James Madison's own telling
example, reviewed in Van Alstyne, Trends in the Supreme Court: Mr. jefferson's Crumbling WallA Comment on Lynch v. Donnelly, 1984 Dt:KE LJ. 770, 776 (payment of congressional chaplains
not consistent with first amendment, though first Congress may not have appreciated this
point).
Of course, one needs to take great care in proceeding in this fashion, othenvise one ends up
falsifying the scope of a clause by degrees. So, for instance, if the number of examples of things
declared to be unaffected by a proposed clause was large, and all of the examples thus given
were themselves characterized by several strong elements in common, they may furnish reason
to reconsider the principle one tentatively (mis)identified to the clause. There are, after all,
"principles" and "principles" -some rather small and restricted, some a great deal larger;
determining which was enacted is as much one's judicial obligation as anything else. (This
point, too, though obvious, is frequently ignored. The preferred tendency is, rather, to press
a clause one likes relentlessly outward-to do ·~ustice" of course.)
36. R. DwoRKIN, supra note 19, at 134-36. But see supra note 35.
37. For example, in Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965),Justice Douglas insisted
that the Court moves much more surefootedly (i.e., less subjectively) in holding state statutes
interfering with intimate decisions by married couples to a strong demand for justification
under the fourteenth amendment's due process clause, though the Court cannot properly
require as much in its review of state laws limiting the field of private contracts involving
neither force nor fraud. See id. at 485-86. His explanation of the different intensities ofjudicial
review in the two kinds of cases was of the kind just reviewed, i.e., that certain express clauses,
while not themselves explicit in protecting rights of marital intimacy, do cast penumbras of
privacy rights, whereas there is no equivalent basis for a like policing of state laws and
commercial contract. See id. at 481-82 (distinguishing Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45
(1905)). Yet, one is bound to note the rationale within Griswold itself fits Lochner identically
insofar as the Griswold rationale was drawn on the basis of penumbras of express clauses (the
first, third, and fourth amendments). Article I, § 10 (concerning state laws impairing the
obligations of contracts) is indubitably an express clause; by mere parity of reasoning, it would
presumably have a penumbra of its own.
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On the other hand, it may well be the case that a rebuttable presumption of generous construction is not in fact always sustainable to one's
satisfaction.3 8 For example, despite the unqualified language of the exceptions clause in article III, and the rebuttable presumption of generous
construction one initially assigns respecting the power the clause grants to
Congres!;, the evidence of limited intended proper use may be such that one
finds the presumption of generous construction unwarranted and, in the
end, overthrown. So one becomes seriously persuaded that the clause
cannot sustain certain uses after all, especially in light of how other clauses
in the same document may bear on the question in some germane way. 39 If
so, then the Court should decide accordingly. It is incumbent on the Court
so to declare-but it must likewise be prepared equally to be as readily
convinced by equivalent evidence elsewhere as was allegedly convincing
here. Thus, if there is equivalently impressive evidence of limited intended
proper uses of the commerce power, for example, and evidence of such
legitimate constrained uses reflected in some cautionary way even by mere
Whether one thinks Grint~old correct or thinks Lochner is not correct does not matter. What
matters, rather, h that the two cases may not be distinguished on the ground justice Dougla:;
himself prO·Josed. Moreover, virtually everyone agrees (myself included) that justice William
0. Dougla~ .vas unquestionably a very smart judge. It is thus not plausible that he was unaware
of this problem. What may one conclude other than that both he and the Court on which he
served were somewhat unwilling to live by a common standard of judicial review?
Agam, th•~re is nothing at all intentionally partisan in these observations; they are wholly
unconfined to the Warren Court's particular ideological drift. For comparison, one may take
a matching example on the seemingly conservative side. Thus, Justice Rehnquist put forth an
extremely pJwerful set of arguments drawn from presuppositions (although not the narrow
wording) of the tenth and eleventh amendments, both in Nevada v. Hall, 440 U.S. 410 (1979),
and in National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976). If the foundations of his
approach in these cases had been used in behalf of other causes and outcomes ideological
democrats also had happened to favor, I do not think justice Rehnquist would have been
savaged in the law reviews nearly so much as he was. His methodology in applying the tenth
and ekventh amendments in those cases is not disapproved by others as a methodology
applied, for example, to the first or the fourth amendment, or to the thirteenth or the
fourtecnth amendments. Admitting all this as I do, it is nonetheless depressing to find the
approach tal.en by Justice Rehnquist to the tenth and eleventh amendments entirely laid aside
in hi~ jurisprudence of other clau·;es and other cases that come before the Court, e.g., the first
and fourth a rnendments with respect to which he held the least generous views of any member
of the Burg,·r Court. For a recent review of some first amendment cases, see Denvir,justice
Bmman,justice Rfhnquist, and Free Spuch, 80 Nw. U.L. RE\'. 285, 293-99 (1985).
38. See w/Jra note 30.
39. As justice Holmes usefully observed about such matters:
All rights tend to declare themselves absolute to their logical extreme. Yet all in fact
are limit~d by the neighborhood of principles of policy which are other than those on
which the particular right is founded, and which become strong enough to hold their
own wlwn a certain point is reached.
HHd&on County Water Co. v. McCarter, 209 U.S. 349, 355 (1908); se.f also generally C. BLAcK,
STHL'C1TR£ .\ND RELATIONSHIP IN CONSTITv'TIONAL L\w (1969).
In the example just &riven, one must notice (and account for) other portions of article III and
part~ of article VI, just as a minimum, in coming to terms with the exceptions clause of article
III The exceptions clause does not exist in a vacuum. Several other clauses may bear on the
~ame problem-clauses possibly establishing "neighborhoods'" of their own that at some
junctun~ may constrain the field of congressional exception to the Supreme Court's appellate
jumdiction. That they may do so-or may not do so-cannot be dismissed or assumed in
ad\ance. See generally Gunther, Congressional Power to Curtail Federal Court jurisdiction: An
Opiuiollated Guide t.J the Ongoing Debate, 36 STAN. L. REv. 895 (1984); Hart, supra note 9.

ANTINOMIAL CHOICES

1297

"penumbras" cast by other clauses (e.g., the tenth amendment40), an
equivalent set of Supreme Court decisions should be in order. But very few
activist judges actually follow this particular path either. They not merely
act "inconsistently" from area to area of constitutional adjudication; they do
so to the point one cannot believe they are really moved by the reasons they
give. I regret to say that I think they occasionally just lie.
Moreover, some so-called rules of judicial review seem vulnerable to
this same criticism because they have little, if any, ground in their own right
at all. They are unlike the general rule of generous construction, the
presumptions of connotation-over-denotation, concept-over-conception, or
the supposition of penumbral coverage. Rather, the "rule" itself tends to be
one of virtual judicial abdication, albeit selectively applied. Indeed, some
such rules have the unintended irony of suggesting that a legislative act may
well be constitutionally defective in fact (i.e., might well be so determined if
the Court were to press the issue); 41 nonetheless the Court adopts a rule
relieving the party relying on the statute of any need to show that the
indispensable constitutional requirements have been met. 4 2
A different sort of example is furnished by the "rule" that the Court
should largely defer to Congress' view of its own powers vis-a-vis those

40.Justice Holmes may well have had just such a tenth amendment (implied) constraint in
mind, for instance, in cautioning that "[c]ommerce depends upon population, but Congress
could not, on that ground, undertake to regulate marriage and divorce." Northern Sec. Co. v.
United States, 193 U.S. 197,402 (1904) (Holmes,]., dissenting). Consider also his observations
on legislative pretext by Congress, see id. at 411 (Holmes, J., dissenting). For a recent general
review, see C. LOFGREN, GoVERNMENT FROM REFLECTION AND CHOICE 70-115 (1986). Note, in
passing, that the power vested in Congress is the power "to regulate Commerce ... among the
several States." U.S. CoNsr. art. I, § 8. It is not a power "to regulate whatever affects commerce
among the several states."
41. SeeR. RoTUNDA,J. NowAK &J. YouNG, 2 TREATISE ON CoNsriTL'TIONALLAw § 15.4 (1986)
(heavy presumption of validity of state economic restrictions reviewed); see also F. STRONG,
supra note 32, at 240 ("[T]he Court must be informed as to legislative objective if its ... exercise
of constitutional review is to be factual rather than fictional."); Gunther, In Search of Evolving
Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REv. 1, 43-46
(1972) (proposing less deferential test that would place greater burden on states to explain
contributions of means to asserted ends).
42. Typically, the standards that the state must meet (in the kinds of cases mentioned supra
note 41) are not at all exacting to begin with. For example, the declared latitude of not
inappropriate objectives on the basis of which private economic liberty may be even severely
curtailed by state legislatures is quite broad. Unless judicial review is to be an empty formality,
the burden to meet those standards should be fairly discharged by the state or by those
claiming the advantage of its actions; if they cannot be met, so much the worse for what the
state presumed to do. As it is, the practical effect of judicial abdication is to advertise the
nullification of the putative constitutional restrictions, allowing legislative bodies an effective
prerogative of enacting naked preferences. See Sunstein, Naked Preferences and the Constitution,
84 CoLUM. L. REv. 1689, 1695-98 (1984) (modem rationality review of legislation illustrates
weak commitment to prohibition of naked preferences and allows raw political power to justify
exercise of authority}; see also Epstein, Foreword to S. MACEDO, THE NEw RIGHT v. THE
CoNSTITUTION at xi-xii (1986) ("OJudges cannot indulge the easy presumption that legislation
is constitutional. . . . Instead, in each case there has to be a neutral inquiry into how the
provisions of a statute square with the language and structure of the Constitution. The
invalidation of legislation is not some extraordinary event in the life of a constitutional
democracy; it is part of the original design.").
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n:served w the states. 43 The rule is itself a simple falsification of the judicial
role. It gains nothing by its commonplace reiteration-its operative effect is
merely to set the fox (Congress) to guard the chickenhouse (federalism)and it is explainable most simply by a tilted predisposition to uphold
congressional fudging by means of partial abdication of the judicial role.H
But it is time to sum up lest by proceeding on in this way we lose sight
of the lesser point with which we began. That point, beyond providing
familiar illustrations of clause bias and of judicial fiddling with standards of
judicial review, was to resettle one's own view of judicial integrity and the
proper role of the Supreme Court. The duty of judicial integrity, I have
argued very simply, is to give the Constitution full faith and credit as
supreme law, in keeping with one's oath as a judge.
Accordingly, one will not cull clauses preferentially, nor will one make
up reasons for resigned or overreaching standards of judicial review. One
will not anticipate amendments from either frustration or moral passion.45
One will not do so whether to take from the Constitution such features one
dislikes, 46 or to embroider it with features one might wish were there, but

43. The t-ltimate version (total abdication of federalism review and legislative-executive
conflict·; by declaring all such questions nonjusticiable) is proposed in J. CHOPER, supra note 2.
44. See Van Alstyne, The Second Death of Federalism, supra note 4, at 1720-27. Compare
Thayer, Tlte Ongin and Scope of the American Doctrine ofConslltutional Law, 7 HARV. L. REv. 129,
151 (1893) w'th Van Alstyne, Interpreting This Constitution, supra note 4, at 220 n.37; compare
Ackerman, supra note 17, at I 049-51 with Van Alstyne, Notes on a Bicentennial Constitution: Part
I, supra note ·1, at 951 n.51. Confronted with a similar suggestion respecting the judicial role
(to defer to the congressional view of its own powers),justice Marshall rejected it as a proposal
to subvert the judicial obligation itself. See G. Gt:NTHER, joHN MARSHALL's DEFENSE OF
McCuLLOCH v. MAIWL~ND 104, 160-61 (1969).
45. Three similes compete within the rhetoric of our Constitution as a "living" constitution,
a celebratory but somewhat facile tum of phrase. Each envisions a different role for the
Supreme Court.
The first treats the Constitution virtually 'as unamendable scripture; thus it must be forcibly
reinterpreted from time to time, kept alive largely by judicial art. The second is even bolder.
Constitutional text is hardly significant in this view; like Proteus, it is capable of assuming
nearly any sh 1pe, which is what judges should indeed undertake to do, guided by the best
notions I)[ the public good.
But I think the better comparison of the living Constitution is with neither of these; the
Constitution is neither much like the Dead Sea scrolls nor like Proteus. Each comparison
assumes emirdy too much, albeit in different ways. A more neutral and compelling figure, so
far as one wants one, is found on the northern California coast. It is there that one finds the
great northern redwoods, possibly the greatest living things on earth. Some are as tall as 300
feet, solid, unmistakable, and unforgettable. Some are 3,000 years old. They are not at all like
Proteus. Neither are they like the dry rustle of the Dead Sea scrolls.
46. Roper: "So now you'd give the Devil benefit of law!"
~lore: "Y<~s. What would you do? Cut a great road through the law to get after the
Devil?"
Roper: "I'd cut down every law in England to do that!"
More: (Roused and excited) "Oh?," (Advances on Roper) "And when the last law was
down, and the Devil turned round on you-where would you hide, Roper, the laws
all being flat?"
R. BoLT, A MAN FOR ALL SEAsoNs 37-38 (1962).
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knows perfectly well are not. One will not come to the Constitution as a
challenge for manipulation; one will come to it as an obligation and as a
trust. 47

47. For two other essays on the main thesis of this article, see Van Alstyne, The Idea of the
Constitution as Hard Law, 37 J. LEGAL Em.:c. 174 (1987); Van Alstyne, Notes on a Bicentennial
Constitution: Part I, supra note 4.

